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Quantum communication networks have the potential to revolutionise information and communi-
cation technologies. Here we are interested in a fundamental property and formidable challenge for
any communication network, that of guaranteeing the anonymity of a sender and a receiver when a
message is transmitted through the network, even in the presence of malicious parties. We provide
the first practical protocol for anonymous communication in realistic quantum networks.
The rapid development of quantum communication
networks will allow a large number of agents with dif-
ferent technological, classical or quantum, capabilities
to securely exchange messages and perform efficiently
distributed computational tasks, opening new perspec-
tives for information and communication technologies
and eventually leading to the quantum internet [1]. Many
applications of quantum networks are known, including,
for example, quantum key distribution (QKD) [2, 3] or
blind and verifiable delegation of quantum computation
[4], and many more are yet to be developed.
A crucial yet challenging functionality required in any
network is the ability to guarantee the anonymity of two
parties, the Sender and the Receiver, when they wish to
transmit a message through the network. In a realistic
network, anonymity should be guaranteed in the pres-
ence of malicious parties. We would additionally like that
this happens in an information-theoretic setting, mean-
ing without making any assumptions neither on the num-
ber nor on the computational power of these malicious
parties, who might in fact have a quantum computer in
their hands.
In the classical setting, anonymity, as well as any mul-
tiparty secure computation, is possible with information-
theoretic security when there is an honest majority of
agents. Furthermore, Broadbent and Tapp [5] showed
how to anonymously transmit a classical message, as well
as a number of other secure protocols, in the absence of
an honest majority. In order to do this, secure pairwise
classical channels are required, as well as classical broad-
cast channels.
In the quantum setting, the first work to deal with the
anonymity of quantum messages was that of Christandl
and Wehner [6]. In their work, one assumes that the n
agents share a perfect n-party GHZ state, i.e., the state
1√
2
(|0n〉+ |1n〉) [7]. Under this assumption, they provide
protocols with perfect anonymity both for the broadcast
of a classical bit and for the creation of an EPR pair
between a Sender and a Receiver. Then, they combine
the two protocols in order to transmit a quantum mes-
sage using a teleportation scheme [8]. This first creates
an EPR pair anonymously between Sender and Receiver,
and then the Sender transmits the two classical outcomes
of her measurements anonymously. The advantage of
this protocol is that it only involves local operations and
classical communication (LOCC) once the GHZ state is
shared between the agents. However, it requires the as-
sumption that a perfect GHZ state has been honestly
shared between the agents. More recently, Lipinska et
al. [9] showed how to perform a similar protocol starting
from trusted W states, albeit only probabilistically.
In order to remedy the drawback of a perfect shared
quantum state, Brassard et al. [10] devised a different
protocol, which includes a verification stage for ensur-
ing that the shared state is at least symmetric with re-
spect to the honest agents, and hence perfect anonymity
is preserved. This test involves each agent performing a
controlled-NOT operation between her initial quantum
bit (qubit) and n − 1 fresh ancilla qubits that she then
sends to all other agents. Each agent then measures n−1
qubits in the subspace spanned by the all zeros and all
ones strings and if the measurement accepts then the pro-
tocol continues with the remaining n-party GHZ state.
While the authors manage in this way to preserve perfect
anonymity, their protocol cannot be easily implemented,
since each agent needs to perform a size-n quantum cir-
cuit and also to have access to quantum communication
with all other agents.
We address this problem by considering quantum
anonymous transmission in the presence of an untrusted
source that may not be producing the GHZ state. Our
two main ingredients are the Christandl-Wehner protocol
for anonymous entanglement [6], and a protocol for veri-
fying GHZ states described in Ref. [11]. We then present
a new notion of approximate anonymity that is appropri-
ate for realistic quantum networks, and show a practical
and efficient protocol to achieve such anonymity in the
transfer of a quantum message.
Communication scenario.—Let us first describe the
communication scenario we consider. Our network con-
2sists of n agents who can perform local operations and
measurements. A source, who may be malicious, pro-
duces GHZ states that our agents wish to use for anony-
mous quantum communication. The source may produce
a different state in every round, or even entangle the
states between different rounds.
The agents themselves may be honest or malicious.
Honest agents follow the protocol but malicious agents
can collaborate with the source, work together, and ap-
ply any cheating strategy on their systems, including en-
tangling them with some ancilla that they may store in
memory to be accessed at will. The aim of the mali-
cious agents is to break the anonymity or security of the
protocol.
In addition to public quantum channels between all
agents, we require some classical communication chan-
nels. More specifically, we assume there are private clas-
sical channels between each pair of agents. This can be
ensured by each pair of agents sharing a private random
string, and is a standard assumption if we have mali-
cious agents in a classical network. Furthermore, each
agent has access to a broadcast channel, which she can
use to send classical information to all other agents. We
will use the term simultaneous broadcast when it is re-
quired that all agents must broadcast their bit simulta-
neously, which is an impractical resource as it is hard
to ensure in practice. Crucially, we only need a regular
(or non-simultaneous) broadcast channel in our anony-
mous quantum communication protocol; all the subpro-
tocols that we use remove the requirement of simultane-
ous broadcasting.
Anonymous classical protocols.—We start by pro-
viding the details of a few known anonymous classical
protocols, some of which we will use directly. First,
there exists a classical private protocol from Ref. [5],
LogicalOR, where each agent inputs a single bit and the
protocol computes the logical OR of these bits. This pro-
tocol has correctness in that if the input of all agents is 0,
the protocol always outputs the correct answer (i.e. 0).
If any agent inputs 1, this protocol succeeds (i.e. outputs
1) with probability 1− 2−S after S rounds. Privacy here
means that only the agent can know their input. Log-
icalOR is built using another protocol Parity [5], which
privately computes the parity of the input string; how-
ever, contrary to the the Parity protocol, LogicalOR does
not require a simultaneous broadcast channel. Further
details of both protocols are given in Appendix A.
We will use the LogicalOR protocol in order to create
the functionality RandomBit, given in Protocol 1, which
allows the Sender to anonymously choose a random bit
according to some probability distribution D. The cor-
rectness and privacy of RandomBit follow directly from
the properties of LogicalOR, namely the only thing the
malicious agents learn is the bit chosen by the Sender,
but not who the Sender is. We then extend the Random-
Bit functionality to define a RandomAgent functionality,
where the Sender privately picks a random agent by per-
forming the RandomBit protocol log2 n times.
Protocol 1 RandomBit
Input: All: parameter S. Sender: distribution D.
Goal: Sender chooses a bit according to D.
1: The agents pick bits {xi}
n
i=1 as follows: the Sender picks
bit xi to be 0 or 1 according to distribution D; all other
agents pick xi = 0.
2: Perform the LogicalOR protocol with input {xi}
n
i=1 and
security parameter S and output its outcome.
Last, we need the Notification functionality [5], given
in Protocol 2, where the Sender anonymously notifies an
agent as the Receiver. Note that we use the same security
parameter S throughout for simplicity, however this is
not required. As we explicitly call on this in our main
protocol, we describe it below.
Protocol 2 Notification [5]
Input : Security parameter S, Sender’s choice of Receiver is
agent r.
Goal : Sender notifies Receiver.
1: For each agent i:
(a) Each agent j 6= i picks pj as follows: if i = r and
agent j is the Sender, then pj = 1 with probability
1
2
and pj = 0 with probability
1
2
. Otherwise, pj = 0.
Let pi = 0.
(b) Run the Parity protocol with input {pi}
n
i=1, with
the following differences: agent i does not broadcast
her value, and they use a regular broadcast channel
rather than simultaneous broadcast. If the result is
1, then yi = 1.
(c) Repeat steps 1(a) - (b) S times. If the result of the
Parity protocol is never 1, then yi = 0.
2: If agent i obtained yi = 1, then she is the Receiver.
Anonymous entanglement with perfect trusted
GHZ states.—In addition to the previous classical pro-
tocols, we will need the Anonymous Entanglement proto-
col from Ref. [6], given in Protocol 3. Here, it is assumed
that the agents share a state which in the honest case is
the GHZ state, and that the Sender and Receiver know
their respective identities. It is not hard to see that as-
suming the initial state is a perfect GHZ state, then the
protocol creates an EPR pair between the Sender and the
Receiver perfectly anonymously.
3Protocol 3 Anonymous Entanglement [6]
Input : n agents share a GHZ state.
Goal : EPR pair shared between Sender and Receiver.
1: Each agent, apart from the Sender and Receiver, applies
a Hadamard transform to their qubit. They measure in
the computational basis and broadcast their outcome.
2: The Sender first picks a random bit b, broadcasts it, and
applies a phase flip σz only when b = 1.
3: The Receiver picks a random bit b′, broadcasts it and
applies a phase flip σz only when the parity of everyone
else’s broadcasted bits is 1.
Efficient verification of GHZ states.—The last in-
gredient we use is the Verification protocol for GHZ states
from the work of Pappa et al. [11] that was also imple-
mented for 3- and 4-party GHZ states in McCutcheon et
al. [12]. There, one of the agents, the Verifier, would like
to verify how close the shared state is to the ideal state.
Let k be the number of honest agents. The verification
protocol is then given in Protocol 4.
Protocol 4 Verification [11, 12]
Input : n agents share state |Ψ〉.
Goal : GHZ verification of |Ψ〉 for k honest agents.
1: The Verifier generates random angles θj ∈ [0, π) for all
agents including themselves (j ∈ [n]), such that
∑
j
θj is
a multiple of π. The angles are then sent out to all the
agents in the network.
2: Agent j measures in the basis {
∣
∣+θj
〉
,
∣
∣−θj
〉
} = { 1√
2
(|0〉+
eiθj |1〉), 1√
2
(|0〉 − eiθj |1〉)}, and sends the outcome Yj =
{0, 1} to the Verifier.
3: The state passes the verification test when the following
condition is satisfied: if the sum of the randomly chosen
angles is an even multiple of π, there must be an even
number of 1 outcomes for Yj , and if the sum is an odd
multiple of π, there must be an odd number of 1 outcomes
for Yj . We can write this condition as
⊕
j
Yj =
1
pi
∑
j
θj
(mod 2).
From the proofs in Refs. [11] and [12], one can see that
the ideal state always passes the verification test, and,
more interestingly, a soundness statement can also be
proven. As in [11], we take the ideal n-party state to be
|Φn0 〉, given by:
|Φn0 〉 =
1√
2n−1
[ ∑
∆(y)=0 (mod 4)
|y〉 −
∑
∆(y)=2 (mod 4)
|y〉
]
,
where ∆(y) =
∑
i yi denotes the Hamming weight of
the classical n-bit string y. This state is equivalent
to the GHZ state up to local unitaries. Analogous to
[11, 12], to measure the quality of the state |Ψ〉 shared
between the n agents, we take a fidelity measure given by
F ′(|Ψ〉) = max
U
F (U |Ψ〉 , |Φn0 〉), where U is any unitary
operation on the space of the malicious agents. This
reflects the fact that we are concerned with certifying
the state up to operations on the malicious parts, since
these are in any case out of the control of the honest
agents. Then, even assuming the malicious agents apply
their optimal cheating strategy, the probability of passing
the test with the state |Ψ〉, denoted by P (|Ψ〉), satisfies
F ′(|Ψ〉) ≥ 4P (|Ψ〉)−3 [11, 12]. Note that this holds even
if the shared state is mixed; however, as we will see later,
a clever malicious source will always create pure states.
For our purposes, we will use below a version of this
verification protocol that is similar to the Symmetric Ver-
ification protocol in Ref. [11]. There, it was shown that
with the use of a trusted common random string it was
possible for all agents to take random turns verifying the
validity of the GHZ state. This leads to the guaran-
tee that if the state is accepted a large number of times
before the agents decide to use it, then with high prob-
ability, when the state is used it should be very close to
the correct one.
Anonymity for realistic quantum networks.—All
the quantum protocols we have seen that are used to
achieve anonymity assume perfect operations and achieve
perfect anonymity. In practice, of course, no operation
can be perfect and hence perfect anonymity is unattain-
able. Nevertheless, it is still possible to define an appro-
priate notion of anonymity that is relevant for practical
protocols.
We define the notion of an ǫ−anonymous protocol,
where for any number n− k of malicious agents out of n
agents in total, the malicious agents, even when they have
in their possession the entire quantum state that corre-
sponds to the protocol, can only guess who the Sender
is (even when the Receiver is malicious) or who the Re-
ceiver is, with probability that is bounded by 1k + ǫ. The
perfect anonymity is defined when ǫ is equal to 0.
Efficient anonymous quantum message
transmission.—We will now show how to devise
an efficient ǫ-anonymous protocol for quantum message
transmission. For simplicity we assume there is only
one Sender. If not, the agents can run a simple classical
protocol in the beginning of the protocol in order to deal
with collisions (multiple Senders) and achieve the unique
Sender property. See also Refs. [5] and [6] for details.
Moreover, for simplicity we will describe a protocol
where we distribute one EPR pair between the Sender
and the Receiver. Then one can perform anonymous tele-
portation of the classical measurement results, using in
particular the Fixed Role Anonymous Message Transmis-
sion functionality as was described in Ref. [5]. In case we
want to increase the fidelity of the transmitted quantum
message, we can further use the subroutines from Bras-
sard et al. [10] which first create a number of non-perfect
4EPR pairs, then distill one pair and then perform the
teleportation. Given that our main contribution is the
efficient anonymous protocol for the GHZ verification,
we do not provide here these details that are explained
in Ref. [5].
Our scheme is outlined in Protocol 5.
Protocol 5 ǫ-Anonymous Entanglement Distribution
Input : Security parameter S.
Goal : EPR pair created between Sender and Receiver with
ǫ-anonymity.
1: The Sender notifies the Receiver:
The agents run the Notification protocol.
2: GHZ state generation:
The source generates a state |Ψ〉 and distributes it to the
agents.
3: The Sender anonymously chooses Verification or
Anonymous Entanglement:
(a) The agents perform the RandomBit protocol, with
the Sender choosing her input according to the fol-
lowing probability distribution: she flips S fair clas-
sical coins, and if all coins are heads, she inputs 0,
else she inputs 1. Let the outcome be x.
(b) If x = 0, the agents run Anonymous Entanglement,
else if x = 1:
(i) Run the RandomAgent protocol, where the
Sender inputs a uniformly random j ∈ [n], to
get output j.
(ii) Agent j runs the Verification protocol as the
Verifier, and if she accepts the outcome of
the test they return to step 2, otherwise the
protocol aborts.
If at any point in the protocol, the Sender realises someone
does not follow the protocol, she stops behaving like the
Sender and behaves as any agent.
We are now ready to analyse the above protocol. First,
note that if the state is a perfect GHZ state and the
operations of the honest agents are perfect, then the
anonymity of the protocol is perfect.
In step 1, the agents run the Notification protocol which
is perfectly anonymous. In the second step, the GHZ
state is shared between the agents, which does not affect
the anonymity. Note that the role of the source can be
played by an agent, as long as the choice of the agent
is independent of who the Sender is. In step 3(a), the
agents run the RandomBit protocol which is also perfectly
anonymous. The analysis of the step 3(b) follows from
the analysis of the Symmetric Verification protocol in
Ref. [11]. The only difference here is that instead of us-
ing a common random string, it is the Sender who picks
the randomness uniformly. Thus, since the input of the
Sender completely determines the outcome of the proto-
col, the Sender can immediately see if her choice does not
correspond to the outcome, and hence only continues if
the randomness is perfectly uniform.
Let Cǫ be the event that the above protocol does not
abort and that the state used for the Anonymous Entan-
glement protocol is such that no matter what operation
the malicious agents do to their part, the fidelity of the
state with the GHZ state is at most
√
1− ǫ2. Then, we
prove the following Theorem for the honest agents:
Theorem 1. For all ǫ > 0,
Pr[Cǫ] ≤ 2−S 4n
1−√1− ǫ2 . (1)
Proof sketch. As proved in [11], the optimal cheating
strategy of a malicious source, which maximises the prob-
ability of Cǫ, is to create in each round of the protocol a
pure state |Ψ〉 such that F ′(|Ψ〉) = √1− ǫ2.
The probability of event Cǫ is then given by the prob-
ability of the state being used and all the tests being
passed in the previous rounds. This in turn will depend
on the success probability of RandomBit, and if the agent
chosen to act as the Verifier is honest. Given that a state
with F ′(|Ψ〉) passes the verification protocol with proba-
bility P (|Ψ〉), we can then determine a bound on Pr[Cǫ]
by following the proof in Ref. [11]. The full proof is given
in Appendix B.
By taking S = log2(
4n
(1−
√
1−ǫ2)δ ), we have Pr[Cǫ] ≤ δ.
Let us assume for simplicity that when the event Cǫ is
true, which happens with probability at most δ, the ma-
licious agents can perfectly guess the Sender or the Re-
ceiver. We will now see that when the event Cǫ is false,
which happens with probability at least 1− δ, the mali-
cious agents cannot guess the Sender or the Receiver with
probability much higher than a random guess. In other
words, there is no strategy for breaking the anonymity of
the communication that works much better than simply
guessing an honest agent at random.
Note that Cǫ being false means that the fidelity of the
shared state with the GHZ state (up to a local operation
on the malicious agents) is at least
√
1− ǫ2. By doing
enough rounds, we can ensure that the probability of Cǫ
is negligible. Our statement of anonymity is given as
follows:
Theorem 2. If the agents share a state |Ψ〉 such that
F ′(|Ψ〉) ≥ √1− ǫ2, then the probability that the mali-
cious agents can guess the identity of the Sender is given
by:
Pr[guess] ≤ 1
k
+ ǫ. (2)
Proof sketch. First, we show that when the shared state
is close to the GHZ state (up to some operation U on
5the malicious agents’ part of the state), then the fidelity
between the final state of the protocol when the Sender
is agent i, |Ψi〉, and the final state of the protocol when
the Sender is agent j, |Ψj〉, is high.
Then, we show that when the fidelity between the
states |Ψi〉 and |Ψj〉 is close to 1, the probability that
the malicious agents can guess the identity of the Sender
is close to a random guess. The full proof is given in
Appendix C.
Finally, we consider the entangled state created anony-
mously between the Sender and Receiver. Although we
have not considered a particular noise model, our analy-
sis incorporates a reduced fidelity of |Ψ〉, the state shared
by all the agents at the beginning of the protocol. We can
carry this forward to the resulting anonymously entan-
gled state, if we assume all the agents are honest and have
followed the protocol. We find that the fidelity of the fi-
nal entangled state with the EPR pair will be at least
the fidelity of |Ψ〉 with the GHZ state. After the entan-
gled state has been constructed, the Sender and Receiver
can perform anonymous teleportation of any quantum
message |φ〉 by anonymously sending a classical message
with the teleportation results. Our final statement is
then given in Corollary 3.
Corollary 3. Using Protocol 5, we can achieve an ǫ-
anonymous protocol for quantum message transmission.
Discussion.—We have proposed a practical protocol
for anonymous quantum communications in the presence
of malicious parties and an untrusted source. The ver-
ification step is carried out using a protocol that has
been experimentally demonstrated [12], and is tolerant
to losses and noise by design. Our protocol achieves in
this full adversarial scenario an approximate notion of
anonymity that we call ǫ-anonymity and which is rele-
vant in the context of realistic quantum networks.
While the scheme in Ref. [10] results in an exponen-
tial scaling, their protocol is not easily implementable.
Recent work in Ref. [9] provides a protocol for anony-
mous transmission using the W state rather than the
GHZ state. While this is beneficial in terms of robustness
to noise, the protocol creates the anonymously entangled
state only with a probability 2/n. Furthermore, the se-
curity analysis considers only the semi-active adversarial
scenario, which requires a trusted source.
Our anonymous quantum communication protocol
opens the way to the integration and implementation
of this fundamental functionality into quantum networks
currently under development.
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APPENDIX A: ANONYMOUS CLASSICAL
PROTOCOLS
We first give the Parity protocol from [5], by which a set
of n agents can privately determine the parity of their in-
put string (or equivalently, the XOR of their input bits),
in Protocol 6. Note that although this uses a simultane-
ous broadcast channel, we only use the modified version
of this protocol (as given in the LogicalOR protocol after-
wards), which just requires a regular broadcast channel.
This protocol is then used to construct the LogicalOR
protocol [5], by which a set of n agents can privately de-
termine the logical OR of their inputs. Due to repeating
the protocol with different orderings of the agents each
time, the simultaneous broadcast channel is no longer
required. This is given in Protocol 7.
If all agents input xi = 0, then the LogicalOR protocol
is correct with probability 1, however if any agent inputs
xi = 1, then the correctness is (1 − 2−S). In Protocol
5, the functionality RandomBit is used to pick between
the verification and use of the state. This in turn calls
LogicalOR. In an honest run, the outcome of Random-
6Protocol 6 Parity [5]
Input : {xi}
n
i=1.
Goal : Each agent gets yi =
⊕n
i=1
xi.
1: Each of the n agents wants to input their bit xi. Every
agent i chooses random bits {rji }
n
j=1 such that
⊕n
j=1
r
j
i =
xi.
2: Every agent i sends their jth bit rji to agent j (j can equal
i).
3: Every agent j computes zj =
⊕n
i=1
r
j
i and reports the
value in the simultaneous broadcast channel.
4: The value z =
⊕n
j=1
zj is computed, which equals yi.
Protocol 7 LogicalOR [5]
Input : {xi}
n
i=1, security parameter S.
Goal : Each agent gets yi =
∨n
i=1
xi.
1: The agents agree on n orderings, with each ordering hav-
ing a different last participant.
2: For each ordering:
(a) Each agent i picks the value of pi as follows: if
xi = 0, then pi = 0; if xi = 1, then pi = 1 with
probability 1
2
and pi = 0 with probability
1
2
.
(b) Run the Parity protocol with input {pi}
n
i=1, with
a regular broadcast channel rather than simulta-
neous broadcast, and with the agents broadcasting
according to the current ordering. If the result is 1,
then yi = 1.
(c) Repeat steps 2(a) - 2(b) S times in total. If the
result of the Parity protocol is never 1, then yi = 0.
Bit is the outcome of the Sender, and so if any agent
behaves dishonestly the Sender will abort. The function-
ality RandomAgent, which also calls LogicalOR, is simply
a repetition of RandomBit, and so the same argument
holds here.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Here, we prove the soundness of the protocol.
Theorem 1. Let Cǫ be the event that the protocol does
not abort and the state used for the anonymous transmis-
sion is such that F ′(|Ψ〉) = √1− ǫ2. Then for the honest
agents, for all ǫ > 0,
Pr[Cǫ] ≤ 2−S 4n
1−√1− ǫ2 . (3)
Proof. Our aim is to bound the probability that the pro-
tocol does not abort and the fidelity of the state |Ψ〉
used for anonymous transmission is given by F ′(|Ψ〉) =
max
U
F (U |Ψ〉 , |Φn0 〉) =
√
1− ǫ2, where U is a general op-
erator on the space of the malicious agents.
Although we allow the malicious source to create any
state in any round and even entangle the states between
rounds, the optimal cheating strategy, which maximises
the probability of the event Cǫ, is to create in each round
some pure state |Ψ〉 such that F ′(|Ψ〉) = √1− ǫ2, as
proved in [11]. In high level, one can first see that an
entangled strategy does not help, as it can be replaced by
a strategy sending unentangled states as follows. Given
some entangled state, for a given round, the probability of
passing the test and the fidelity of the state depend only
on the reduced state, conditioned on passing previous
rounds. The exact same effect can be achieved by sending
these mixed reduced states corresponding to each round,
without any entanglement.
Next, one sees that by providing a mixed state, the
source does not gain any advantage, as a mixed state
is a probabilistic mixture of pure states, and the over-
all cheating probability of this mixed strategy is just
a weighted combination of the cheating probabilities of
each of the pure states. Then, obviously this mixed strat-
egy is worse than the strategy that always sends the pure
state that has the maximum cheating probability of all
states in the mixture. Hence, one can continue the proof
by only considering strategies with pure states.
Moreover, since the adversary is just trying to max-
imise the probability the state |Ψ〉 used for anonymous
transmission has F ′(|Ψ〉) = √1− ǫ2, it is clear that there
is no need to send any state with even smaller F ′(|Ψ〉),
since then the probability of failing the test (and there-
fore the protocol aborting) would just increase. Last,
if in any round the source created a state with higher
F ′(|Ψ〉), then this certainly does not contribute to the
event Cǫ, and in fact it may also cause the protocol to
abort. Thus, to upper-bound the probability of event Cǫ
with respect to the best attack a malicious source can
perform, we only need to consider the case where in each
round the malicious source creates some state |Ψ〉 such
that F ′(|Ψ〉) = √1− ǫ2.
First, we consider the probability that the state is used
in round l. For this to happen, the Sender must get
the result of all S coin flips to be heads (x = 0), which
happens with probability 2−S . The Sender then calls
RandomBit with her input as 0. The output of RandomBit
will then be 0 with probability 1, since all agents input
0 (note that the Sender can see if any agent behaves
dishonestly and inputs 1, as the output of RandomBit
can then be 1, and so the Sender will abort).
Second, we consider the probability that the state is
tested in all (l − 1) previous rounds. Here, the Sender
must input 1 to RandomBit. First, the probability of the
Sender not getting all S coin flips to be 0 is given by 1−
2−S. Then, the probability that RandomBit will give an
output of 1 is given by 1−2−S after S rounds. Malicious
7agents will not affect the output, since even if they input
1 to RandomBit, the output will still be 1. Thus, the
overall probability is given by [(1− 2−S)(1 − 2−S)]l−1.
Finally, we consider the probability that all the (l− 1)
tests have passed. In our protocol, a randomly chosen
agent j runs the Verification protocol as the Verifier. If
the Verifier is honest (which happens with probability
k
n ), the probability that the test is passed with a state
|Ψ〉 is given by P (|Ψ〉). If the Verifier is malicious (with
probability n−kn ), we take the probability to be 1 as the
worst case scenario. Then, we can write the probability
that all (l− 1) tests have passed as (n−kn + knP (|Ψ〉)
)l−1
.
Note that from [11], the probability that a state |Ψ〉 with
fidelity F ′(|Ψ〉) will pass the test is given by P (|Ψ〉) ≤
3
4 +
F ′
4 .
Thus, the total probability of event Cǫ at the l
th rep-
etition of the protocol is:
Pr[Clǫ] ≤ 2−S
(
1− 21−S + 2−2S
)l−1(
1− (k − F ′k
4n
))l−1
.
(4)
We then take the integral to upper bound this probability
as follows:
Pr[Cǫ] ≤
∫ ∞
0
2−S(1 − 21−S + 2−2S)l
(
1− (k − F ′k
4n
))l
dl
(5)
≤ 2−S
∫ ∞
0
(
1− (k − F ′k
4n
))l
dl (6)
= − 2
−S
log (1− (k−F ′k4n
)
)
(7)
≤ 2−S 4n
k(1− F ′) (8)
≤ 2−S 4n
k(1−√1− ǫ2) . (9)
Since each honest agent does not know which other
agents are honest or malicious, we can further upper-
bound this in terms of a security statement for the honest
agents:
Pr[Cǫ] ≤ 2−S 4n
1−√1− ǫ2 . (10)
If the agents take S = log2(
4n
(1−
√
1−ǫ2)δ ), they get
Pr[Cǫ] ≤ δ. The expected number of runs of the protocol
is given by 2S = 4n
(1−
√
1−ǫ2)δ . Thus, they can make this
probability of failure negligible by doing a large number
of runs.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Next, we prove the anonymity of the protocol. For
simplicity of the proof, recall that we denote the ideal
state by |Φn0 〉, which can be obtained from the GHZ state
by applying a Hadamard and a phase shift
√
Z to each
qubit. The Sender’s transformation now becomes σxσz .
Further, we also define the state:
|Φn1 〉 =
1√
2n−1
[ ∑
∆(y)=1 (mod 4)
|y〉 −
∑
∆(y)=3 (mod 4)
|y〉
]
,
(11)
and note that σxσz |Φn0 〉 = |Φn1 〉 , σxσz |Φn1 〉 = − |Φn0 〉.
We consider two cases here: first, when all the agents
are honest (Lemma 2A), and secondly, when we have
malicious agents who could apply some operation on their
part of the state (Lemma 2B).
Lemma 2A. If all the agents are honest, and they share
a state |Ψ〉 such that F (|Ψ〉 , |Φn0 〉) =
√
1− ǫ2, then for
every honest agent i, j who could be the Sender, we have
that F (|Ψi〉 , |Ψj〉) ≥ 1− ǫ2, where |Ψi〉 is the state after
agent i has applied the Sender’s transformation.
Proof. If we have F (|Ψ〉 , |Φn0 〉) = |〈Ψ|Φn0 〉|2 =
√
1− ǫ2,
then similarly to [11] we can write the state shared by all
the agents as:
|Ψ〉 = (1− ǫ2)1/4 |Φn0 〉+ ǫ1 |Φn1 〉+
2n−1∑
i=2
ǫi |Φni 〉 , (12)
where
∑2n−1
i=1 ǫ
2
i = 1 −
√
1− ǫ2. If agent i is the Sender,
then she applies σxσz, and the state becomes:
|Ψi〉 = (1− ǫ2)1/4 |Φn1 〉 − ǫ1 |Φn0 〉+
2n−1∑
i=2
ǫ′i |Φni 〉 . (13)
Instead, if agent j is the Sender and she applies σxσz ,
the state becomes:
|Ψj〉 = (1− ǫ2)1/4 |Φn1 〉 − ǫ1 |Φn0 〉+
2n−1∑
i=2
ǫ′′i |Φni 〉 . (14)
The fidelity is then given by:
F (|Ψi〉 , |Ψj〉) = |〈Ψi|Ψj〉|2 (15)
=
∣∣∣∣∣
√
1− ǫ2 + ǫ21 +
2n−1∑
i=2
ǫ′iǫ
′′
i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(16)
≥ 1− ǫ2. (17)
Lemma 2B. If some of the agents are malicious, and
they share a state |Ψ〉 such that F ′(|Ψ〉) ≥ √1− ǫ2, then
for every honest agent i, j who could be the Sender, we
have that F (|Ψi〉 , |Ψj〉) ≥ 1− ǫ2, where |Ψi〉 is the state
after agent i has applied the Sender’s transformation.
8Proof. Recall that our fidelity measure is given by
F ′(|Ψ〉) = max
U
F (U |Ψ〉 , |Φn0 〉). Let us now denote by
|Ψ′〉 = U |Ψ〉 the state after the operation U which max-
imises this fidelity has been applied. As in [11], we can
write this state in the most general form as:
|Ψ′〉 = ∣∣Φk0〉 |ψ0〉+ ∣∣Φk1〉 |ψ1〉+ |χ〉 , (18)
where note that |χ〉 contains both honest and malicious
parts, of which the honest part is orthogonal to both
∣∣Φk0〉
and
∣∣Φk1〉.
We want to find the closeness of the states |Ψi〉 , |Ψj〉,
which are the states after the σxσz operation is applied
to |Ψ′〉 by either agent i or j who is the Sender. These
states are given by:
|Ψi〉 =
∣∣Φk1〉 |ψ0〉 − ∣∣Φk0〉 |ψ1〉+ |χ′〉 , (19)
|Ψj〉 =
∣∣Φk1〉 |ψ0〉 − ∣∣Φk0〉 |ψ1〉+ |χ′′〉 . (20)
The fidelity is then given by:
F (|Ψi〉 , |Ψj〉) = |〈Ψi|Ψj〉|2 (21)
= |〈ψ0|ψ0〉+ 〈ψ1|ψ1〉+ 〈χ′|χ′′〉|2. (22)
However, although the overall state |Ψ′〉 is normalised,
the malicious agents’ part of the state is not. Thus, we
need to determine a bound on 〈ψ0|ψ0〉 and 〈ψ1|ψ1〉. We
have:
F (|Ψ′〉 , |Φn0 〉) = |〈Φn0 |Ψ′〉|2 ≥
√
1− ǫ2. (23)
It was shown in [11] that we can write for any k, n:
|Φn0 〉 =
1√
2
[ ∣∣Φk0〉 ∣∣Φn−k0 〉− ∣∣Φk1〉 ∣∣Φn−k1 〉
]
, (24)
and using this, we get:
1
2
|(〈Φn−k0 ∣∣ψ0〉)2 + (〈Φn−k1 ∣∣ψ1〉)2
− 2 〈Φn−k0 ∣∣ψ0〉 〈Φn−k1 ∣∣ψ1〉 | ≥
√
1− ǫ2. (25)
Using the triangle inequality, we have:
1
2
[∣∣〈Φn−k0 ∣∣ψ0〉∣∣2 + ∣∣〈Φn−k1 ∣∣ψ1〉∣∣2
]
≥
√
1− ǫ2. (26)
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have:
〈ψ0|ψ0〉+ 〈ψ1|ψ1〉 ≥
∣∣〈Φn−k0 ∣∣ψ0〉∣∣2 + ∣∣〈Φn−k1 ∣∣ψ1〉∣∣2
(27)
≥
√
1− ǫ2. (28)
Since the overall state |Ψ′〉 is normalised, we have
〈χ′|χ′′〉 ≤ 1 − √1− ǫ2. Thus, we get our expression for
fidelity as:
F (|Ψi〉 , |Ψj〉) = |〈ψ0|ψ0〉+ 〈ψ1|ψ1〉+ 〈χ′|χ′′〉|2 (29)
≥ 1− ǫ2. (30)
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. If the agents share a state |Ψ〉 such that
F ′(|Ψ〉) ≥ √1− ǫ2, then the probability that the mali-
cious agents can guess the identity of the Sender is given
by:
Pr[guess] ≤ 1
k
+ ǫ. (31)
Proof. We will now show that if the agents share close
to the GHZ state, then the Sender remains anony-
mous. From Theorem 1, we saw that the probability
that the state used for anonymous transmission satisfies
F ′(|Ψ〉) ≤ √1− ǫ2 is given by Pr[Cǫ] ≤ δ for the hon-
est agents, where δ depends on the number of runs of
the verification protocol. Thus, by doing enough runs,
we can make this very small, and so we have that the
state used for anonymous transmission will be close to
the GHZ state, as given by F ′(|Ψ〉) ≥ √1− ǫ2.
From the previous proof, we see that if F ′(|Ψ〉) ≥√
1− ǫ2, the distance between the states if agent i or
j was the Sender is D(|Ψi〉 , |Ψj〉) ≤ ǫ. A malicious agent
who wishes to guess the identity of the Sender would
make some sort of measurement to do so. Thus, we wish
to find the maximum success probability of a measure-
ment that could distinguish between the k states that
are the result of the Sender (who can only be an honest
agent) applying the σxσz transformation.
The success probability of discriminating between k
states is given by
∑k
i=1 piTr(Πiρi). From Lemma 2B, we
know that the distance between any two states after the
Sender’s transformation is upper-bounded by ǫ. Thus, if
we take |α〉 = |Ψj〉, then we know that any of these k
states is of distance ǫ away from this same state |α〉.
For any POVM element P , we can write the trace dis-
tance between two states ρ, σ as Tr
[
P (ρ−σ)] ≤ D(ρ, σ).
Thus, we have for a POVM element Πi and for states
|Ψi〉 , |α〉:
Tr(Πi |Ψi〉 〈Ψi|)− Tr(Πi |α〉 〈α|) ≤ ǫ. (32)
Assuming that each honest agent has an equiprobable
chance of becoming the Sender, the probability that the
malicious agents can guess the identity of the Sender is
9bounded by:
Pr[guess] =
k∑
i=1
1
k
Tr(Πi |Ψi〉 〈Ψi|) (33)
≤ 1
k
k∑
i=1
[
Tr(Πi |α〉 〈α|) + ǫ
]
(34)
=
1
k
Tr
[ k∑
i=1
Πi |α〉 〈α|
]
+
1
k
kǫ (35)
=
1
k
Tr(|α〉 〈α|) + ǫ (36)
=
1
k
+ ǫ. (37)
